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The efforts of developing countries are
being subjected to scrutiny as never before, and
the help they may expect from developed countries
is increasingly dependent on what conclusions
the latter reach about the performance of the
former. This heightened interest would be wel-
come as a positive contribution to increased
efficiency in aid use and development if the
assumptions and criteria on which assessment of
performance is founded reflected a sensitivity
to the needs of the recipients. It is abundantly
clear, however, that current practices are rudi-
mentary in concept, and cannot be relied on.
As a first step they could be improved by drawing
on the already substantial body of research on
the development process and the effects of
external resources in moulding that process.
The most important single weakness in present
performance assessments is the practice of taking
general criteria, borrowed from developed econo-
mies, and applying them to developing countries
without due regard to political, social, cultural
and institutional differences and to the possib-
ility that aspirations (and indeed the meaning
of 'development') may differ from place to place.
The ODI study on Ghana tries to assess
development performance in that country from a
local angle. In this way it is hoped to pin-
point some specific shortcomings in currently
used performance criteria, and show the impli-
cations on, a) recipient/donor relations, and,
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b) recipient policies. More specifically, the
study tackles the following six questions.
What objectives did Ghana set itself at the on-
set of internal self-rule, and why? How
realistic were these objectives, given Ghana's
circumstances from 1951 onwards? How well did
it do in furthering these objectives? How far
would Ghana's policies have had to be modified
for them to conform to accepted Western norms of
sound performance? Would this have required
a change in development objectives as opposed to
mere changes in techniques? If Ghana had moved
closer to donor thinking earlier (it did after
the 'coup') what overall effect would this have
had, especially if aid had been forthcoming?
ODI had previously looked at aid operations
in Uganda and Tunisia. Both studies brought
out some of the pitfalls of too much donor orien-
tation in aid policy and development thinking.
The choice of Ghana for extending the scope of
the inquiry may at first sight appear surprising.
Ghana' s economy under Nkrumah has been almost
unanimously written off as an unmitigated mess,
and it received very little official aid from
Western donors. These apparent disadvantages
turn out in practice to be advantages from the
research stand-point. Because of the near
unanimity of views on Ghana it is much easier
to contrast what one might call Western devel-
opment orthodoxy with Ghana's chosen path. It
may be more difficult to find merits in Ghana's
policy by juggling performance criteria than in
countries on which opinions have been more
divided, but if one does, the lesson that can be
learnt from this should prove more interesting.
As to aid, Ghana shows that its absence can have
as far-reaching repercussions as its presence.
Moreover, since Ghana did receive substantial
offers of aid after the overthrow of Nkrumah,
it provides an opportunity for shedding light on
donor policies in circumstances which present
themselves only rarely.
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The study sets about tackling the questions
previously listed by first establishing Ghanats
economic situation at the beginning of the 1950s,
analysing the government' s short and long-term
development goals and what policy 'options' were
open to it. Next the changes in policy are
traced, and reasons offered for Ghana's choice of
particular options. At each stage an assessment
is made of the appropriateness of the choice in
the light of the country's own objectives (as far
as they can be established) , and a tentative
comparison is drawn with the hypothetical outcomes
of different courses of action. Special attention
is paid to Ghana's relations with potential aid
donors and investors, and the development of
western countries' views on aid and investment in
Africa.
Many of Ghana' s current problems originate
in the choice of ambitious development goals in
the early 1950s, when the economy was less
healthy than was supposed, and persevering with
these goals in increasingly difficult economic
conditions. Failure to attract private invest-
ment in the fifties and Western aid in the early
sixties compounded these problems. Why this
happened is not easy to establish; many influ-
ences were at work and it seems that over most
of them Ghana had little control. This concl-
usion is at odds with the generally accepted
explanation, which puts the blame squarely on
Ghana for discouraging investors and offending
western donors, but there is enough evidence to
suggest that such an explanation is too super-
ficial. In the face of the resource shortage,
and an imbalance between directly productive
and long-term investments (a result of early
policy decisions), continued determination to
proceed with a fast development pace pushed
Ghana towards state enterprise, financed
largely by commercial credits and Eastern loans,
often of a very dubious nature.
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Whether Ghana should have turned to State
enterprise or not does not appear to have been
a conscious policy dilemma. The choice was
rather on the pace of development; because of
the critical importance of this the study seeks
to isolate the factors - political, social and
personal - working in favour of a maintained
momentum. Once a fast pace was chosen, the
state enterprise experiment looked inevitable,
given sluggishness of the local private sector
and the cool relations between Ghana and coun-
tries capable of supplying the lion's share of
private investment and government aid.
It is tempting to conclude that Ghana
would have done much better if it had received
more sympathetic consideration from the West.
The evidence, however, is somewhat uncertain.
It suggests that Ghana would have had to pay a
price for more sympathetic attention. It
might have been helped to increase its effici-
ency in the execution of policies, but it
might also have had to amend, perhaps radically,
its whole strategy. It is difficult to say
whether, on balance, this would have been bene-
ficial0 Ghana would certainly have been left
with a more manageable debt-burden, but it
would also have had to lower its rate of expen-
diture. The effect of closer contact with
aid donors would have been to steer it to more
cautious and orthodox policies; but it is very
doubtful whether this is what was wanted.
Although the overall conclusions of the
study on Ghana's performance are not clear-cut,
they nevertheless show that what it tried to
do, and did, had much more merit than is gener-
ally supposed. In this lies a lesson worth
mulling over when drawing up performance criteria
which are to be used as a basis for aid eligi-
bi li ty
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